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THE EVOLUTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN DERIVATIVE 
ACTION: FLOODGATES TO SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM? 
 
KENNY YANG
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Corporations Law – Company Management – Shareholder Activism – Statutory 
Derivative Action – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
 
This paper will first introduce the notion of a derivative action and examine the 
evolution of derivative action in Australia, from the general law to its current 
statutory form. It will highlight the perceived inadequacies of the former and the 
attempts  of  the  statutory  regime  in  curing  its  predecessor‘s  defects.  It  will 
analyse these distinctions, coming to a conclusion that the statutory approach 
does little more than encapsulate and lend clarity to the position at general law 
in Australia and as far as current research suggests, does not lead to shareholder 
activism.  
 
I     INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the primary objectives of an investor as shareholders in businesses is to 
see a return, and hopefully a high one at that, on their investment. It is however, 
against the norms of business management to allow its affairs to be dictated by 
investors. Such a function rests with the directors of the company. Despite this, 
the astute investor can sometimes influence business management decisions in a 
number of ways, one such way being the derivative action. Investors may wish 
to utilize derivative action for their own benefit, the most obvious of which is 
the  maximization  of  their  investment  returns,  where  they  feel  that  company 
management  has  been  negligent  or  underperforming.  While  the  derivative 
action  was  traditionally  a  common  law  one  and  had  its  own  limitations, 
Australia  enacted  the  statutory  derivative  action  in  2000.  The  concern  is 
whether in removing the common law barriers to derivative action, the statutory 
derivative action has allowed undue shareholder interference and opened the 
doors  to  shareholder  activism.  Has  Australia  struck  the  right  balance  in 
providing  shareholders  with  the  appropriate  recourse  to  corporate 
mismanagement  and  in  allowing  the  board  sufficient  room  to  appropriately 
manage the company? For the purposes of this paper, ‗shareholder activism‘ is 
defined  as  actions  by  interested  investors  designed  to  influence  the 
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contemporary  norms  of  company  management  by  means  of  ‗shareholder 
inspired litigation.‘
1 References to section numbers refer to the Corporations 
Act 2001 (Cth) unless otherwise stated. 
 
II     THE GENERAL LAW OF DERIVATIVE ACTION 
 
Derivative action is an exception to the general principle that a person cannot 
sue to  obtain relief on  behalf  of  another  person  who has been injured by  a 
wrongdoer.
2  It is an action that is brought in the name and on behalf of a 
company. It is ‗derivative‘ in that the right to sue does not inherently exist in the 
name of the party taking the action, but is ‗derived‘ from the company.
3  
 
A     The Tussle for Control 
 
It has been established that shareholders do not, in general, control the company 
and  its  operations.
4  Powers of  management  are  generally  accorded  to the 
directors of the company, and as Greer LJ stated, ‗if powers of management are 
vested in the directors, they and they alone can exercise these powers … They 
cannot  themselves usurp  the powers by  which  the  articles  are  vested  in  the 
directors‘.
5  It  is  however,  necessary  to  strike  a  balance  between  holding 
management accountable and giving them sufficient leeway to run the company 
effectively. 
 
B     The Case of Foss v Harbottle 
 
Foss v Harbottle arose as a result of two shareholders commencing action on 
behalf of themselves and other shareholders on allegations that the directors of 
the company had fraudulently misappropriated the company‘s funds.
6 Wigram 
VC held that ‗the corporation should sue in its own name and its corporate 
character or in the name of someone whom the law has appointed to be its 
representative‘.
7  The  power  to  initiate  proceedings  generally  rests  in  the 
directors of a company, and without their support, no action on behalf of a 
company can proceed.
8 This rule comprises two principles:
9 first, the ‗proper 
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plaintiff‘ rule, based on the principle that a company is a separate legal entity, 
distinct  from  its  shareholders.
10  The  second  principle  is  the  ‗internal 
management‘ doctrine, based on the premise that the courts should be slow to 
interfere with the internal management of companies where management act in 
accordance with their powers.
11 These two principles work together to restrict 
the standing of individual shareholders to bring derivative actions.
12 
 
At least one author has suggested that the decision not to allow the action may 
have  stemmed  from  ‗a  desire  to  uphold  contemporary  norms  of  company 
management and ownership.
13 The underlying vein of the argument, that control 
and management of the company is properly vested in its directors, is apparent. 
It would be  
the very antithesis of the statutory control structure to allow shareholders to 
make, in essence, a management decision. Injustice, we are to assume, is not a 
problem because individual shareholders contract into this arrangement upon 
entering the company and therefore should be aware of the consequences.
14  
The rule in Foss v Harbottle reflected the courts at that time – to lean towards 
the ‗best interests of the company‘, and such interests, as determined by its 
directors  or  the  majority,  should  take  precedence  over  any  minority 
shareholders.
15  As  one  judge  held,  ‗[e]ven  if  the  minority  is  profoundly 
convinced that a decision not to sue is wrong, the minority is a minority and not 
the majority.‘
16  
 
The rationale for the decision is understandable, given the context in which 
Foss v Harbottle was being decided. The modern form of a corporation as we 
know it and the concept of limited liability was still some years away,
17 and it 
has been suggested that corporations incorporated via individual private statute 
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was little more than private partnerships.
18 Accordingly, the usual notions of 
mutual trust and good faith, akin to a partnership, underline the relationship in 
the consultation process of such a company. Necessarily then, it was considered 
that  in  promoting  risk  taking  and  entrepreneurship,  protection  should  be 
afforded to directors against undue shareholder interference.
19 It was deemed 
that members knowingly enter into this statutory contract and should therefore 
be cognisant of its control mechanisms and any consequences that flow.
 20 
 
C     Exceptions to the Rule 
 
However as the corporate group, rather than the private partnership model, is  
becoming more prominent and accepted as a means for business operations,
21 
there have been concerns that without judicial interference, there may be an 
increasing inability for members to control the actions of errant directors.
22 This 
has given rise to some lifting of the restrictions in shareholder remedies, 
perhaps  in  recognit ion  of  that  fact  that  such  corporate  groups,  being  the 
‗quintessential model of corporate business activity‘,
23 has moved the concern 
of errant directors from the private to the public realm and as such, requires 
greater  judicial  supervision  to  ensure  shareholder‘s  rights  are  appropriately 
protected. Since Foss v  Harbottle, this has been encapsulated in a number of 
exceptions:
24 (1) the ‗special majority‘ exception,
25 where action has been taken 
expressly against provisions in the constitution requiring a special majority to 
authorise the action, a shareholder could commence proceedings to challenge 
the validity of the resolution, (2) the ‗ultra vires‘ exception,
26 where no illegal or 
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ultra vires action  may  be  taken, (3) the  ‗personal  rights‘  exception,
27  which 
allowed  for  remedies  by  way  of  personal  action,  and  (4)  the  ‗fraud  on  the 
minority‘ exception,
28 comprising two components – where the action amounted 
to a fraud on the minority and the wrongdoers were in control of the company,
29 
the  minority  shareholders  w ere  permitted  to  bring  an  action  against  the 
wrongdoers on behalf of the company.
30 There is some debate as to whether the 
fifth ‗interest of justice‘ exception exists (as will discussed further below),
31 
where an action could be brought where the interests of justice demands it. It 
has been suggested that this exception is ‗too nebulous, vague and infinitely 
elastic‘,
32 though it has seen increasing acceptance in Australian courts.
33 
 
II     THE AUSTRALIAN STATUTORY DERIVATIVE ACTION 
 
A     Dissatisfaction with the Common Law 
 
While  the  restrictions  of  Foss  v  Harbottle  had  the  advantage  of  allowing 
decisions to be left in the hands of management and directors and protecting 
them  from  individual  shareholder‘s  interference,
34  this  was  deemed 
unsatisfactory  as  the  rule  was  too  limited  in  scope  and  could  leave  errant 
directors unaccountable. There was also argument as to the inconsistency and 
complexity  of  the  exceptions  to  Foss  v  Harbottle.  Additionally,  issues  of 
ratification,  standing  and  costs  were  often  cited  as  barriers  to  interested 
shareholders in initiating action.
35  
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231. 
35  Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic Reform  Bill 1988 [6.14] –
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B     Introduction of Part 2F.1A 
 
The statutory derivative action (‗SDA‘) came into effect in Australia in the form 
of Part 2F.1A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) replacing the right to such an 
action under the general law,
36 and allows current and former members and 
officers of a company to bring an action on behalf of the company.
37 Born as a 
result of the perceived inadequacies of the common law,
38 its distinction with its 
predecessor is marked by notable attempts to cure its defects. 
 
1     Standing and Leave 
 
Under  the  general  law,  the  onus  of  establishing  the  restrictive  standing 
requirements  was  often  a  long  and  difficult  process.
39  However, the SDA 
removes the uncertainty of the common law on the standing requirements, 
leaving the decision to be exercised by the court, after having regard to the 
criteria in s 237(2) which states that the Court must grant leave where it is 
satisfied  that (a) it is probable that the company will not itself bring the 
proceedings, or properly take responsibility for them; and (b) the applicant is 
acting in good faith; and (c) it is in the best interests of the company that the 
applicant be granted leave; (d) there is a serious question to be tried; (e) and the 
provision of relevant notice.
40 
 
The  courts will be satisfied that a company will not take action where the 
directors have denied allegations,
41 where the company is a family-held one and 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Duties of Directors and Officers of a Company by Means of a Statutory Derivative Action, 
Discussion  Paper  No 11,  at 
<http://takeovers.gov.au/content/Resources/cslrc/cslrc_discussion_paper_no_11.aspx>. 
36  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 236(3). 
37  Ibid. 
38  Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill, 6.23; 
CCH Australian Corporations Commentary, CCH Australia, [54–100];  Corporate Law 
Economic  Reform  Program  Proposals  for  Reform,  Directors‘  Duties  and  Corporate 
Governance:  Facilitating  Innovation  and  Protecting  Investors  (Paper  No  3,  1997)  32; 
Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Report on a Statutory Derivative Action 
(July 1993) 6; Report of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional  Affairs,  Corporate  Practices  and  the  Rights  of  Shareholders  (November 
1991) 193. 
39  Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] 1 Ch D 204, 221–2; 
William  Kaplan  and  Bruce  Elwood,  ‗The  Derivative  Action:  A  Shareholder‘s  ―Bleak 
House‖?‘ (2003) 36 University of British Columbia Law Review 443, 451 n 481; L S 
Sealy, ‗Foss v Harbottle – A Marathon Where Nobody Wins‘ (1981) 40 Cambridge Law 
Journal 29, 32. 
40  The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 237(2). 
41  Braga v Braga Consolidated Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 603.  
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its family members do not wish to bring an action,
42 where the company has 
insufficient funds,
43  or where it is rife with internal issues.
44  This can also 
happen where the board is unable to make a decision or where for example, the 
person accused of the wrongdoing has control or influence over the board.
45 
 
The applicant must also satisfy the Court that the applicant has been made in 
good faith. This requires that the Court considers whether the applicant honestly 
believes that a good cause of action exists and has a reas onable prospect of 
success; and  the applicant must not have an ulterior motive for bringing the 
derivative action that would amount to an abuse of process.
46 Good faith will be 
lacking where the SDA is being used to place pressure on stakeholders in the 
corporation.
47  
 
The criteria of ‗best interests of the company‘
48 have caused most difficulty for 
the courts.
49 Sufficed to say, it is the financial state of the company in reference 
to  its  welfare  that  the  courts  are  concerned  with.
50  For  example,  while 
continuing to operate and trade profitably has been deemed to be in the best 
interests of the company,
51 in circumstances where a company is insolvent, its 
best interest may turn to reflect its creditors.
52 It is worth noting that this is a 
higher standard than  the Canadian, New Zealand and Singapore counterparts, 
which only require that the action is in the interests of the company.
53 
 
Finally, the Court must be satisfied that there is a ‗serious question to be tried‘. 
The threshold for this criterion is a relatively low one,
54 with the applicant only 
                                                           
42  Swansson v Pratt [2002] NSWSC 583. 
43  Carpenter v Pioneer Park Pty Ltd (In Liq) [2004] NSWSC 1007. 
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45  Swansson v R A Pratt Properties Pty Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 313; Cannon Street Pty Ltd v 
Karedis [2004] QSC 104, [145]; Braga v Braga Consolidated Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 
603, [5]; Lakshman v Law Image Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 888, [22]; Reale v Duncan Reale 
Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 174, [10]; Saltwater Studios Pty Ltd v Hathaway [2004] QSC 435, 
[6]; Metyor Inc (formerly Talisman Technologies Inc) v Queensland Electronic Switching 
Pty Ltd  (2002) 42 ACSR 398; RTP Holdings Pty Ltd v Roberts (2000) 36 ACSR 170 cited 
in Ramsay, above n 30. 
46  Swansson v RA Pratt Properties Pty Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 313, 320. 
47  Chapman v E-Sports Club Worldwide Ltd (2000) 35 ACSR 462. 
48  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 237(2)(c). 
49  Ramsay, above n 30. 
50  Charlton  v Baber (2003) 47 ACSR 31. See also  Swansson  v RA Pratt  Properties  Pty 
Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 313, 324 for a list of factors the court considers. 
51  Goozee v Graphic World Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 640, [73]. 
52  Charlton v Baber (2003) [2003] NSWSC 745, [53]. 
53   Ramsay, above n 30 (emphasis in original). 
54  Swansson v Pratt [2002] NSWSC 583, [25].  
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having  to  prove  an  ‗arguable  case‘.
55  While  the  SDA  has  in  place  notice 
provisions of up to 14 days,
56 the courts have evinced a willingness to grant 
leave even when this has not been met.
57 
 
2     Ratification 
 
As a derivative action could only be brought by a shareholder against a director 
for the director‘s breach of duty if the breach was unable to be ratified by the 
company, ratification has been described as ‗[u]ndoubtedly the greatest legal 
difficulty with the existing derivative remedy.‘
58 The law on ratification is also 
at times inconsistent, and it is difficult to discern what actions can and cannot be 
ratified.
59 Section 239 deals with the barrier of ratification, stating that while it 
is taken into account by  the court it alone would not prevent a person from 
bringing an action.
60 
 
3     Costs 
 
Access to company funds in bringing an action also posed a barrier to interested 
shareholders  under  general  law.
61  While s 242 does give the Court broad 
discretion in granting costs, it has been pointed out that the provisions were 
deliberately  drafted  in  a  manner  that  denies  the  successful  applicant  the 
assurance that court recognition will result in the company being liable for costs 
incurred.
62 Indeed, in a study of 19 successful leave applications since the SDA 
in Australia, in none of the cases did the Court require the company to fund the 
applicant‘s litigation.
63  
                                                           
55  Mhanna v Sovereign Capital Ltd [2004] FCA 1300, [31]. 
56  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 237(2)(e). 
57  Braga v Braga Consolidated Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 603, [8]. 
58  Companies and Securities Advisory Committee, Report on a Statutory Derivative Action 
(July 1993) 6. 
59  Lynne Taylor,  ‗Ratification  and the Statutory Derivative action in  the  Companies  Act 
1993‘ (1998) 16 Company & Securities Law Journal 221, 223. See also B H McPherson, 
‗Duties of Directors and the Powers of Shareholders‘ (1977) 51 Australian Law Journal 
460, 468–9. 
60  Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 239. 
61  Sarah Watkins, ‗The Common Law Derivative Action: An Outmoded Relic?‘ (1999) 30 
Cambrian Law Review 40. See Smith v Croft [1986] 2 All ER 551 and Parker v National 
Roads & Motorists Association (1993) 11 ACSR 370, 382 which held that interim funding 
orders should not be made until after discovery and only in cases of genuine need cited in 
Ramsay, I and Saunders B, ‗Litigation by Shareholders and Directors: An Empirical Study 
of  The  Statutory  Derivative  Action‘  (Research  Report,  Centre  for  Corporate  Law  and 
Securities Regulation, The University of Melbourne 2006) 35. 
62  K  Fletcher,  ‗Clerp  and  Minority  Shareholder  Rights‘  (2001)  13  American  Journal  of 
Comparative Law 290, 300. 
63  Ramsay, above n 30, 35.  
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4     Concisely Stating the Law 
 
One  of  the  successes  of  the  SDA  was  that it  clearly  articulated  the  law  on 
derivative  action,  rather  than  having  to  contend  with  the  ‗complex  and 
obscure‘
64 nature of the common law relating to derivative action. It replaces 
‗140 years of procedural codswallop‘
65 with a more concise and understandable 
form. 
III     THE GATES TO SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM – DERIVATIVE ACTION: 
SWORD OR SHIELD? 
 
Shareholder activism by way of interference with company management is an 
issue that runs contrary to the traditional notions of the management principle.
66 
Derivative action seeks to strike a balance between ensuring remedies for 
members, yet allowing for directors freedom to run the company.
67 There may 
be a concern that the SDA, in lifting much of the restrictions in  Foss  v 
Harbottle, could lead to overzealous shareholder litigation.  
 
A     Australia’s Already Liberal Approach to Foss v Harbottle 
   
However, while standing and ratification have often been cited as obstacles to 
commencing litigation, Australian courts have already minimized the barriers of 
Foss v Harbottle. Indeed, as Sealy notes, ‗one frequently finds the judge putting 
the issue on one side‘,
68 effectively circumventing the rule. For example, In 
Hurley  v  BGH  Nominees,
69  King  CJ  found  it  inappropriate  to  follow  the 
English‘s  restrictive  position  in  Prudential  Assurance.
70  Furthermore, 
Australian courts have developed a fifth ‗interest of justice‘ exception, and were 
willing to allow derivative action where it was in the interest of justice.
71 This 
‗fifth exception‘ however, was not always the accepted position and there was 
initial ‗doubt as to whether this judgment exception is part of the law‘.
72 Cope v 
                                                           
64  Brian  R  Cheffins,  ‗Reforming  the  Derivative  Action:  The  Canadian  Experience  and 
British Prospects‘ (1997) 2 Company, Financial and Insolvency Law Review 227, 233. 
65  L S Sealy, ‗Foss v. Harbottle – A Marathon Where Nobody Wins‘ (1981) 40 Cambridge 
Law Journal 29, 32. 
66  John Shaw & 875 Sons (Salford) Limited v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113,134. 
67  Lawrence A Larose, ‗Suing in the Right of the Corporation: A Commentary and Proposal 
for Legislative Reform‘ (1986) 19 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 499, 
503. 
68  L S Sealy, ‗The Rule in Foss v Harbottle: The Australian Experience‘ (1989) 10 Company 
Lawyer 52. 
69  Hurley v BGH Nominees Pty Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 387, 38. 
70  Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] 1 Ch D 204, 221–2. 
71  Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd (1993) 11 ACSR 785. 
72  Mesenberg v Cord Industrial Recruiters Pty Ltd (1996) 19 ACSR 483, 486.  
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Butchland however, a matter before the Supreme Court of Western Australia, 
marked a milestone for the development and acceptance of this ‗fifth exception‘ 
as in that case, even the defendants conceded the possibility of a ‗interest of 
justice exception‘.
73 This pragmatic approach evinces a willingness to overcome 
the barriers to common law derivative action, effectively circumventing the rule 
in Foss v Harbottle.
74  
 
B     Barriers to Derivative Action 
 
The other effective barrier to derivative action – costs, has not been entirely 
solved by the SDA. There is no automatic entitlement to costs and while the 
Court does exercise broad discretion in costs under s 242, Thai suggests that 
members continue to be at the mercy of the Court whether or to grant costs. 
This is further evinced in the study by Ramsay, which noted that in only three 
applications were costs granted outright.
75 As investors are after all interested in 
seeing a return on their investment, it is not a stretch of the imagination to see 
that shareholders may not be overly keen to engage in a derivative action if such 
a route offers no guarantee that their court costs would be covered. Accordingly, 
this would suggest that members are perhaps no better off under the statutory 
regime than the position at general law in Australia. 
 
Ramsay and Saunders found that in the five years since the introduction of the 
SDA, there have been a modest thirty -one delivered judgments on statutory 
derivative  action  compared  to  the  thirty  in  the  five  years  prior  to  the 
introduction of Part 2F.1A.
76 Of the thirty-one applications, only nineteen was 
granted leave.
77 Another article suggests that while the SDA does provide some 
mechanism  for  shareholders  to  intervene,  its  own  restrictions  effectively 
minimizes the potential for abuse and vexatious litigation.
78 These studies seem 
to demonstrate that the courts have not seen a significant increase in derivative 
action litigation since the commencement of the SDA. It would seem then that 
the  SDA  has  not,  as  one  might  have  feared,  opened  the  floodgates  to 
overzealous shareholder activism. 
 
                                                           
73  (1996) 20 ACSR 37, 40. 
74  Anil Hargovan, ‗Under Judicial and Legislative Attack: The Rule in Foss v Harbottle‘ 
(1996) 113 South African Law Journal 631, 636–7. 
75  Out of 19 applications, 3 were successful in being granted costs outright, 1 was successful 
in part, 4 were not granted costs and 6 had costs reserved. In the remaining 5 cases, costs 
were not discussed; see Ramsay, above n 30. 
76  Ibid. 
77  Ibid. 
78  Hofmann, above n 63.  
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There is of course, a more practical commercial concern that may also be a 
barrier to invoking the SDA. Shareholders who commence statutory derivative 
action imply corporate mismanagement. Accordingly, court proceedings and the 
associated negative publicity that inevitably flows may result in a decrease in 
the value of the company‘s shares (where the company is listed on the stock 
exchange).
79 Similarly, even where the allegation may be ultimately unfounded, 
it is difficult for a company to recover from the negative impact on reputation 
the  proceedings  might  have  had  and  this  may  accordingly  affect  future 
performance of the company‘s shares.
80 
 
Where the Australian SDA allows judicial discretion in awarding costs — and 
as  argued  above  the  courts  have  evinced  a  general  reluctance  to  do  so  — 
Australia‘s closet neighbour, New Zealand, has in its SDA, express provisions 
that the court must order the costs of proceedings to be paid by the company,
81 
unless this would be unjust or unequitable.
82 This has, in some ways, removed 
much of the barriers to commencing a derivative action. While some have 
suggested that Australia should consider adopting the New Zealand position,
83 it 
is contended that the purpose of the Australian SDA, as articulated in the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program 
Bill  1998  was  to  find  an  appropriate  b alance  in  providing  recourse  to 
shareholders for corporate wrongdoings and to prevent any unnecessary and 
frivolous proceedings designed to usurp the traditional norms of company 
management, that would be in any case, unsuccessful in court.
84 The current 
regime does this effectively. By leaving the award of costs at the discretion of 
the courts the Australian SDA forces potential litigants to consider their position 
seriously before commencing a claim.  
 
IV     CONCLUSION 
 
It is contended that other than clearing up much of the confusion at general law, 
the SDA does little more than to merely encapsulate the common law.
85 While 
English courts have been conservative in their approach, Australia has generally 
                                                           
79  Ibid 16. 
80  Ibid. 
81  Berkahn, above n 3, 96. 
82  Companies Act 1993 (NZ) s 166; Melissa Hofmann, ‗The Statutory Derivative Action in 
Australia: An Empirical Review of it Use and Effectiveness in Comparison to the United 
States, Canada and Singapore‘ (2005) 1 Bond Law Review 17, 13. 
83  Thai, above n 77. 
84  Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Bill  1988 [6.33]; 
Lang Thai,  ‗How Popular are Statutory Derivative Actions  in  Australia? Comparisons 
with United States, Canada and New Zealand‘ (2002) 30 Australian Business Law Review 
118, 131. 
85  Thai, above n 77.  
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taken a less restrictive interpretation to the exceptions in Foss v Harbottle.
86 As 
such, while  much  of  the  ‗complex  and  arcane‘
87  inconsistent  authority  have 
been cleared up by the SDA, its approach is arguably no more liberal than what 
Australian courts were already prepared to accept prior to the SDA. Indeed, if 
the above mentioned studies hold true, it would appear that the modest number 
of judgments before and after the SDA demonstrate that derivative action in 
Australia both under general law and the statutory regime strike an effective 
balance in ensuring shareholders have avenues to hold managers accountable 
where necessary, yet allowing sufficient freedom for managers to effectively 
run the company without interference.  
 
                                                           
86  Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings (1993) 11 ACSR 785; Ruralcorp Consulting Pty Ltd v 
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